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Abstract 
 
This paper is a part of the document which my colleagues and I prepared for the National Air 
Traffic control System (NATS), UK, to highlight the problem areas involved in the design, 
development, implementation, upgrade and management of safety critical distributed systems. 
NATS monitors and decides the flight paths of civilian aircrafts in the British air space. Its 
operations are conducted centrally from West Drayton, and its engineers are reported to have 
stated that the strain on the central system grows inexorably, stretched to the limits during busy 
periods. A way to address these concerns is to scale up the system through decentralisation and 
maximal re-use of the existing legacy software. In this approach, the existing (central) system 
needs to be deployed as subsystems in many, geographically-apart centres; each subsystem will 
be responsible for a well-defined sub-domain of the over-all air-space and must frequently 
coordinate its activities with other subsystems so that certain services it provides are correct and 
consistent at the system level. The core requirement here is to have certain distributed services, 
which support such an expansion in a reliable and responsive manner. The services we identify 
here are generic enough to support a wide range of applications, say, from constructing global 
auction services over the Internet to managing replicated database servers on an institutional 
network.  
The focus of this paper is to highlight how such services can be constructed. We indicate the 
various models available and identify their strengths and weaknesses, thus exposing the design 
options available to a system builder. We expound on a particular model by presenting the 
features of the NewTop system that is designed in Newcastle and implemented in a CORBA 
compliant manner. 
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1. Basic Concepts and Terminology 
1.1. Introduction 
This section presents basic concepts and terminology in the area of safety-critical distributed 
systems. The material presented here has been taken from [Laprie 95, Lee 90, HSC 98, Storey 
96, IEC 95]. 
It is now common-place to see computer systems entrusted with functions upon which human 
life can depend. Dependability is defined as the trustworthiness of a computer system such that 
reliance can justifiably be placed on the service it delivers. The service delivered by a system is 
its behaviour as it is perceived by its user(s); a user is another system (human or physical) which 
interacts with the former. The concept of dependability embodies a number of attributes, chief of 
which are availability (readiness of use), reliability (continuity of service), and safety (avoidance 
of catastrophic consequences on the environment). 
The term ‘safety-critical’ will be taken to mean both safety system (system that responds to 
potentially hazardous fault by implementing the safety action necessary to prevent the 
consequences), and safety-related system (system that could through its actions, or lack thereof, 
have an adverse affect on the safety of the equipment or plant).  
It is useful to clarify the distinction between safety and reliability. Safety is achieved through 
the use of reliable structures, components, systems and procedures. Whereas reliability may be 
determined by the probability of failure per demand, safety is determined by the possible 
consequences of these failures. For example, in a reactor safety system, the primary functionality 
concerns the requirement to shut the reactor down safely when needed, and keep it in a safe state 
for a specified period of time. If the computer sub-system of the safety system is unreliable (too 
high a probability of its not carrying out the shut-down function correctly when demanded), then 
there will be an unacceptable effect upon the safety of the wider system. Thus, a safety-critical 
computing system must be capable of providing specified services in a timely manner. Since all 
hardware components will eventually fail, and not each and every software component can be 
guaranteed to be free from bugs, the computing system must be built with sufficient amount of 
hardware and software redundancy such that the system continues to provide correct services in 
the presence of a bounded number of (hardware, software) component failures.  
1.2. Systems and their Failures 
1.2.1. Fault tolerance 
A system is defined to consist of a set of components together with a design. The components 
of a system are themselves systems as is the design. The phrase ‘design of a system’ is used here 
to refer to that part of the system which actually supports the interactions of the components, and 
does not refer to either the abstract notion of a system design or to the process by which the 
system was designed. 
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The internal state of a system is the aggregation of the external states of all its components. 
The external state of a system is an abstraction of its internal state. During a transition from one 
external state to another, the system may pass through a number of internal states for which the 
abstraction, and hence the external state is not defined. We assume the existence of an 
authoritative specification of behaviour for a system which defines the external states of the 
system, the operations that can be applied to the system, the results of these operations and the 
transitions between external states caused by these operations. 
In our everyday conversations we tend to use the terms ‘fault’, ‘failure’ and ‘error’ (often 
interchangeably) to indicate the fact that something is ‘wrong’ with a system. However, in any 
discussion on reliability and fault-tolerance, a little more precision is called for to avoid any 
confusion. A failure of a system is said to occur when the behaviour of the system first deviates 
from that required by the specification. The reliability of the system can then be characterised by 
a function R(t) which expresses the probability that no failure of the system will have occurred 
by time ‘t’. We term an internal state of a system an erroneous state when that state is such that 
there exists circumstances (within the specification of the use of the system) in which further 
processing by the normal part of the system will lead to a failure. The phrase ‘normal part of a 
system’ is used here to admit the possibility of introducing in the system extra components and 
design to specifically prevent possible failures. Such additions are referred to as the redundant 
(exceptional or abnormal) part of the system. The term ‘error’ is used to designate that part of the 
internal state that is ‘incorrect’. The terms ‘error’, ‘error detection’ and ‘error recovery’ are used 
as casual equivalents for ‘erroneous state’, ‘erroneous state detection’ and ‘erroneous state 
recovery’. 
We next inquire as to why does a system enter an erroneous state (that leads to a failure)? The 
reason for this could be either a failure of a component or the design (or both). Naturally, a 
component (or design) being a system, it itself fails because of its internal state being erroneous. 
It is often convenient to be able to talk about causes of a system failure without actually referring 
to internal states of the system’s components and design. We achieve this by referring to the 
erroneous state of a component or design as a fault in the system. A fault could either be a 
component fault or a design fault; so a component fault can result in an eventual component 
failure and similarly a design fault can lead to a design failure. Either of these internal (to a 
system) failures will cause the system to go from a valid state to an erroneous state; the transition 
from a valid to an erroneous state is referred to as the manifestation of a fault. 
To summarise: a system fails because it contains faults; during the operation of a system a 
fault manifests itself in the form of the system state going into an erroneous state such that - 
unless corrective actions by the redundant part of the system are undertaken - a system failure 
will eventually occur. 
Two complementary approaches have been noted for the construction of reliable systems. The 
first approach, which may be termed fault prevention, tries to ensure that the implemented 
system does not and will not contain any faults. Fault prevention has two aspects: 
(i) fault avoidance techniques are employed to avoid introducing faults into the system (e.g. 
system design methodologies, quality control); 
(ii) fault removal techniques are used to find and remove faults which were inadvertently 
introduced into the system (e.g. testing and validation). 
The second approach which has been termed fault-tolerance is of special significance to us 
because of the impracticality of ensuring absence of faults in a system containing a large number 
of components. Four constituent phases of the fault-tolerance approach have been identified: (i) 
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error detection; (ii) damage assessment; (iii) error recovery; and (iv) fault treatment and 
continued system service. 
(i) Error detection: In order to tolerate a fault, it must first be detected. Since internal states of 
components are not usually accessible, a fault cannot be detected directly, rather its 
manifestations that causes the system to go into an erroneous state can be detected. Thus the 
usual starting point for fault-tolerance techniques is the detection of errors. 
(ii) Damage Assessment: Before any attempt can be made to deal with the detected error, it is 
usually necessary to assess the extent to which the system state has been damaged or corrupted. 
If the delay involved between the manifestation of a fault and the detection of its erroneous 
consequences - this delay may be identified as the latency interval of that fault - is large then it is 
likely that the damage to the system state will be more severe than if the latency interval were 
shorter. 
 (iii) Error Recovery: Following error detection and damage assessment, techniques for error 
recovery must be utilized in an attempt to obtain a normal error-free system state. In the absence 
of such an attempt (or if the attempt is not successful) a failure is likely to ensue. There are two 
fundamentally different kinds of recovery techniques. The backward recovery technique consists 
of discarding the current (corrupted) state in favour of an earlier state (naturally, mechanisms are 
needed to record and store system states). If the prior state recovered to is that before the 
manifestation of the fault then an error free state will have been obtained. In contrast a forward 
recovery technique involves making use of the current (corrupted) state to construct an error free 
state. 
(iv) Fault Treatment and Continued Service: Once recovery has been undertaken, it is 
essential to ensure that the normal operation of the system will continue without the fault 
immediately manifesting itself once more. If the fault is believed to be transient, no special 
actions are necessary, otherwise, the fault must be removed from the system. The first aspect of 
fault treatment is to attempt to locate the fault; following this, steps can be taken to either repair 
the fault or to reconfigure the rest of the system to avoid the fault. 
The four aspects of fault-tolerance from the basis for most fault-tolerance techniques and 
provide a sound foundation for design and implementation of reliable systems. 
1.2.2. Modelling Faulty behaviour of components 
The term software implemented fault-tolerance is often used to refer to the software 
techniques for tolerating (hardware, software) component faults. The resulting algorithms will be 
termed fault-tolerant algorithms. The typical function of a fault-tolerant algorithm of a system is 
to detect failures of the system’s component and to attempt to tolerate these failures so as to 
provide specified services. One of the problems in constructing these algorithms is finding out 
the likely failure modes of components, so that specific fault-tolerant measures can be deployed. 
Of course if a component fails in a manner other than assumed then no guarantee of fault-
tolerance  can be provided. We will therefore present a classification for expressing faulty 
behaviour of components; the material is taken from [Ezhilchelvan 86, Cristian 91a, Powell 95]. 
We will consider the response of a component for a given input to be correct if the output 
value is as expected and produced on time. This then allows us to characterise failures in both the 
value and time domains, as we discuss below. 
Let a component receive at time ti an input requiring a response from the component and as a 
result produce an output value v at time tj. For that input, the response v at time tj is correct iff: 
  7
(i) the value is as expected: v = w, where w is the expected value consistent with the 
specification; and, 
(ii) it is produced on time: tmin ≤ tj - ti ≤ tmax, where , [ti+ tmin, ti + tmax] is the interval 
during which the specified output is expected to be produced. 
The values tmin and tmax are constants of a given component. First of all, we note that the 
response of a component cannot be instantaneous to a given input but must experience a finite 
minimum amount of delay which is specified by the parameter tmin.  The maximum delay time, 
tmax indicates the upper bound on the output delay. 
A correctly functioning component does not arbitrarily produce responses. In particular, when 
there is no input (null input) or when no response is expected for an input, naturally no output 
value is produced (output is null). The values tmin and tmax are meaningful only when a 
component is expected to produce a response. 
If v ≠ w, then the output value will be termed incorrect; similarly, if tj < ti + tmin (output 
produced too early) or tj > ti + tmax (output produced too late), then the response time will be 
termed incorrect. 
Given the above definitions of correct and incorrect responses, there can be four possible 
ways by which a response can deviate from that specified. This leads to the following types of 
faults. 
(i) Timing Fault 
A fault that causes a component to produce the expected value for a given input either too 
early or too late will be termed a timing fault and the corresponding failure a timing failure. 
Using our notation: 
v = w and (tj - ti < tmin or tj - ti > tmax). 
A late timing fault is also referred to as a performance fault [Cristian 91a] 
(ii) Value Fault 
A fault that causes a component to respond, for a given input, within the specified time 
interval, but with a wrong value will be termed a value fault and the corresponding failure a 
value failure: 
v ≠ w and tmin ≤ tj - ti ≤ tmax. 
(iii) Omission Fault 
A fault which causes a component, for a given input requiring a non null response, not to 
produce a response will be termed an omission fault and the corresponding failure an omission 
failure.  
We can regard ‘not producing a response’ as equivalent to ‘producing a null value on time’, 
thereby treating an omission fault as a special case of a value fault. We can also treat an omission 
fault as a special case of a timing fault by regarding ‘not producing a response’ as equivalent to 
‘producing a correct value at infinite time’. 
(iv) Byzantine Fault 
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A Byzantine fault is responsible for a Byzantine (fail-uncontrolled) failure which is any 
violation from the specified behaviour. In particular, it includes the possibility of a component 
producing a response when no input was supplied. A Byzantine component is customarily 
considered in the literature to be capable of being ‘malicious’ in its responses.
 
omission
value timing
Byzantine
 
Fig. 1: Fault Lattice 
A Byzantine fault (failure) subsumes all the other three types of faults (failures). The 
relationships among these four types of faults (failures) can be expressed by the fault (failure) 
lattice shown in fig. 1, where an arrow from A to B, indicates that fault (failure) type A is a 
special case of fault (failure) type B. (The relation ‘→’ is transitive.) An important observation 
can now be made which is that a fault-tolerant algorithm designed to tolerate m, m > 0, timing 
failures (value failures) can also tolerate m omission failures and further that an algorithm 
designed to tolerate m Byzantine failures can tolerate m failures of any type. The top of the 
lattice represents the fault type with most restrictions and the bottom with the least. 
The above classification is based on the behaviour of a component with respect to a single 
output. When a sequence of outputs over a given time interval is considered, the type of fault in 
the component will be taken to be the least restrictive one of which all types of failures occurred 
during that interval can be considered to be special cases. If a given faulty behaviour persists for 
a ‘sufficiently’ long time, then that failure can be considered to be permanent. In particular, a 
component that suffers a persistent omission failure will be said to have failed in a fail-silent  
manner (also referred to as a crash-failure). Non persistent failures are called transient failures.   
A processor that, perhaps momentarily, stops functioning, a sensor that occasionally fails to 
produce output signals and a communication channel that loses messages are examples of 
omission failures. A processor producing erroneously computed values on time, a timely delivery 
of a corrupted message are examples of value failures. An overloaded processor producing late 
responses is an example of a performance (timing) failure, a fast timer which sends an early 
timeout signal is an  example of (an early) timing failure. A failed processor producing arbitrary 
outputs, a processor altering source/destination of messages it is relaying are examples of 
Byzantine failures. 
1.2.3. Selecting fault models of system components  
How do we select fault models of system components? Bearing in mind that if a component 
fails in a manner other than assumed for implementing fault-tolerance then no guarantee of 
correct delivery of service can be provided, the safest approach would be to assume the least 
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restrictive model, that is, failed components can perform arbitrary state transitions (exhibiting 
uncontrolled, Byzantine behaviour). The effects of such faulty behaviour must be prevented from 
manifesting in the results delivered by an application program. Unfortunately, this necessitates 
deployment of massive amounts of redundancy, in the limit, a minimum of 3K+1 components to 
mask the failure of K components is required for implementing certain system functions 
[Lamport 82] and output results need majority voting, requiring 2K+1 components to mask the 
failures of up to K components. This is unattractive from both economic and performance view 
points. If the likelihood of Byzantine failures is rare - as would normally be the case - then good 
system design should reduce (or eliminate altogether) the need for deploying massive amounts of 
redundancy. 
The practical approach is to build systems out of components whose failures can be described 
by restrictive failure models thereby necessitating lesser amounts of redundancy. Here the choice 
is often the crash failure model: components are assumed to either work correctly or fail by 
stopping. As an example, assuming application processes fail independently and do so by 
crashing and that functioning processes can communicate (i.e., there is no network partition), 
only K+1 process replicas are required to mask the failure of upto K replicas and no output 
voting is required; if  network partitions are possible then 2K+ 1 replicas are necessary. 
Of course, in principle there is always the possibility of a component failing in a manner not 
catered for, leading to a system failure.  We will say that the fault model of a component is 
realistic if the probability of the system failing due to the component failing in a manner not 
catered for can be shown to be acceptably small.  
1.3. Concluding Remarks 
We began by examining the distinction between safety and reliability and then developed the 
basic concepts of fault-tolerance. We conclude with some brief remarks on the overall distributed 
systems architecture. In general, at the heart of any distributed system capable of providing high 
availability of system services will lie a number of redundancy management protocols: those 
necessary for managing redundant networks, redundant processors and application level process 
replicas. The next chapter presents modular ways of composing such protocols.   
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2. Models of Responsive Distributed 
Computing 
2.1. Introduction 
We model a distributed system by concentrating on a key attribute that is very significant in 
building responsive applications: processing and communication delays. We illustrate the 
implications of the interaction of this attribute with another key attribute - the component failure 
modes discussed in the previous chapter. These implications are presented by addressing three 
fundamental questions. (a) Basic Services: What are the essential services which could help build 
reliable and responsive applications? (b) Feasibility: Can these services be implemented for a 
given combination of delay and failure assumptions? If so, how? If not, Why not? (c) Useful 
Restrictions: When an implementation of the basic services is not feasible, what kind of 
restrictive (yet realisable) assumptions can be made to make the implementation feasible? 
A responsive system must have some degree of fault-tolerance so that its availability can be 
maintained despite failures of some of its components. Fundamental to providing fault-tolerance 
is failure-detection which initiates the planned remedial activities. In applications where timely 
responses are important or desired, detecting the untimely behaviour of, or absent responses 
from, components of a distributed system, such as nodes, links etc., requires a prescription of 
what constitutes a timely behaviour of such system components. Obtaining such a prescription is 
not always possible; even where possible it may not be done with total certainty. Reflecting this 
reality, a range of models for distributed computing have emerged, of which synchronous and 
asynchronous models are the two extreme ends. 
Irrespective of the model considered, building a distributed application itself is a complex task 
and needs to be done in a structured manner. This task is simplified if certain lower-level 
services upon whom other services depend, are available. We call such services basic services 
and consider the implementation of two of them in different models. We will first illustrate the 
usefulness of these two services in building a highly available system using passive replication 
strategy. 
Let f+1, f   GLVWULEXWHG SURFHVV UHSOLFDV IRUP D JURXS WR SURYLGH D VHW RI DYDLODEOH
services. They are uniquely ranked and fail independently. A replica either operates correctly or 
crashes. Only the highest ranked replica, called the primary, processes, and responds to the client 
requests. Assume that the identity of the primary is made known to clients through some binding 
service; clients make service requests to the primary. For every received request, the primary 
multicasts to other replicas (i) the request itself before processing it, and (ii) the state changes 
effected and any response produced due to processing of the request. If ever the primary crashes, 
the highest ranked among the surviving replicas becomes the new primary and continues with the 
processing of client requests. The group can provide services despite at most f process crashes. 
An implementation of passive replication is highly simplified if the following basic services 
are available. A reliable multicast service which ensures that if the primary crashes during a 
multicast either all functioning replicas or none of them receive that multicast, and a group 
  11
membership service which promptly informs the functioning replicas of replica crashes and the 
order in which those crashes occurred. This second service facilitates prompt selection of new 
primary after the existing one crashed, and the first one guarantees that the survivors are in 
agreement on the last multicast the old primary made before it crashed so that the transfer of the 
processing role from the old to the new primary remains correct and transparent to the clients.  
In the next section, we define system models and the basic services. Section 2.3 discusses the 
implementation of the basic services in the synchronous model and section 2.4 presents how the 
assumptions of the synchronous model are met in real systems. Many a basic service cannot be 
implemented in a deterministic manner in the asynchronous model. So, we present in section 2.5, 
the two widely-used approaches to "restricting" the asynchronous model so that the desired can 
be achieved: the implicit and the explicit timing of the model. Section 2.6 concludes the chapter.  
2.2 Models and Services 
We consider modelling of a distributed system based on the degree of confidence with which 
one can define the worst case execution speeds of nodes in the system, and the worst case 
message transmission delays between any pair of nodes. If these worst case performance figures 
can be known, it is possible to establish the upper bounds on the delays the node operating 
system or the communication subsystem will take to provide a given service. Such a service 
could be scheduling a task by the node operating system, transmitting a message from one 
distributed process to another, etc. The confidence with which these bounds can be established is 
crucial to determining whether responsive applications can be built and if so, how. 
2.2.1 Synchronous and Asynchronous Models 
The synchronous model permits upper bounds to be determined with full certainty, and any 
violation of this bound is to be regarded as a failure. More precisely, the following bounds are 
usually assumed to be known in a distributed system that is considered to be synchronous.  
Bounded Scheduling Delays: Within a correct node, any task that is scheduled to be executed 
at time t, will commence the execution before t+ σ. 
Bounded Transmission Delays: If a process p in a correct node decides at time t to form and 
send a message m to process q in another correct node, then m is received by q before t+ δ. 
Bounded Clock Running Rates: Every process in a correct node has access to a hardware 
clock whose drift rate from real-time (or standard time) is bounded by a known constant κ. The 
value of κ is about 10-6 for crystal clocks. This means that a crystal clock can gain or lose with 
respect to real-time at most 1 microsecond per 1 second. 
Given that the bounds σ, δ and κ are known, we can ’synchronise’ the clocks of correct nodes 
such that for some known constants ε and α: 
 (i) At any given instance of real time, the clock readings of any two correct nodes will differ by 
at most ε (precision), and  
 (ii) the clock readings of a correct node will differ from real-time by at most α (accuracy). 
A survey on clock synchronisation protocols appears in [Ramanathan90] and the issues of 
clock synchronisation on wide area networks are addressed in [Verissimo97]. 
In the asynchronous model, the bounds σ, δ and κ are finite but cannot be known with any 
certainty. Compared to the synchronous model, it may more accurately represent a wider class of 
practical systems: a node that occasionally gets overloaded with processing will not be 
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considered to have failed if the scheduling delay exceeds a carefully-estimated bound; similarly, 
a message delivery that takes longer than the normally expected delays due to, say, network 
congestion is not a failure. In other words, the asynchronous model regards fluctuations in 
processing and network loads as inevitable and does not hold them as potential causes of failures. 
That the time bounds on system services cannot be known with certainty, should not imply 
that there is no notion of failures in the asynchronous model. The model does require that the 
delays, though unknown, be finite, i.e., the system services must be provided at some (hardly 
predictable) point in time. Thus, the model admits all failures defined in chapter 1, except timing 
failures. While it may be realistic to regard slowing down of service provision due to fluctuations 
in processing and network loads as normal behaviour and not as failures, the other side of this 
aspect is that the model does not allow a crashed component (that permanently stopped 
functioning) to be deterministically distinguished from a slow functioning component. To 
illustrate this undesirable aspect of the model, suppose that process p sends at local clock time T 
a service request to another remote process q via a reliable link. Based on the past interactions 
with q, p is to (irreversibly) decide that q has crashed if it does not receive q’s response by T + d, 
for some finite d. If q is functioning slowly and is to send its response after T + d, then p’s 
decision will be wrong. We can argue that p’s decision can go wrong for any finite d it chooses. 
So, p must wait for ever to make the correct decision. This is the basic cause for certain 
impossibility results which we will later encounter for this model. 
2.2.2. Specifications of Basic Services 
Consider a group G of distributed processes that cooperate for achieving a common goal. Let 
p and q be two processes in G. 
Multicast Services 
A process p is said to send a multicast message m, if the node of p transmits a copy of m to all 
processes in G (including p). 
Reliable Multicast 
A reliable multicast (RMCast for short) has the following three properties: 
(i)  if a correct process p sends m then every correct process in G (including p) delivers m. 
(validity)         
(ii) for any m, every correct process in G delivers m at most once, and only if m was sent by 
some process in G. (integrity) 
(iii) if a correct p delivers m then every other correct q in G also delivers m. (agreement) 
Validity ensures that messages sent by correct processes are delivered without any failures. 
The integrity property guarantees that any message delivered to a correct process is sent by some 
process in G and is delivered exactly once; further it allows non-delivery of a message from a 
faulty process since the faulty sender can fail while sending the message. Agreement property 
ensures that correct processes are unanimous in delivering or not delivering a message from a 
faulty process. 
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Figure 1. Delivery of Messages and View Changes. 
Figure 1(a) illustrates the guarantees of an RMCast service. P1, P2 and P4 are correct 
processes and P3 crashes before it can transmit m3 to P1 and P2. An RMCast service ensures that 
messages m1 and m2, sent respectively by P1 and P2, are delivered to every correct process 
exactly once, and m3 is delivered to either all or none of the correct ones. Figure 1(a) depicts the 
case of m3 being delivered. Observe that correct processes deliver messages in different order: 
P1 and P2 deliver m1, m2, and m3, while P4 does m2, m1, and m3. 
Ordered Multicast Services 
An atomic multicast (AMCast) service guarantees that correct processes deliver messages in 
an identical order. Thus, AMCast provides the following in addition to RMCast guarantees: 
if correct processes p and q both deliver m and m’, then p delivers m before m’ if and only if q 
delivers m before m’. (identical order) 
Referring fig 1(a), an AMCast service will ensure that correct processes deliver the three 
messages identically in one of six ways. Total Order multicast (TMCast) restricts many possible 
orderings into one of only those which respect the causal precedence relation among messages 
[Lamport78]. This relation is usually denoted as → and m → m’ is true only if  
(i)  m and m’ are sent by the same process p and p sends m before it sends m’; or 
(ii)  p delivers m and then sends m’; or 
(iii)  there exists a non-empty sequence of messages a1, a2, .. , an such that m → a1, ai → 
a(i+1) for every i, 1 LQDQGan → m’.  
TMCast has the following in addition to AMCast properties: 
if m → m’ then a correct process delivers m’ only after it has delivered m. (causal precedence) 
Many protocols (such as the one described in Appendix IIB) only meets a weaker version of 
the above property mainly for reasons of efficiency and particularly when Byzantine failures are 
assumed: if a correct process delivers m and m’ and if m → m’, then it delivers m’ only after it has 
delivered m. To see the difference, let G be {p, q, r, r’}, and let r and r’ be faulty. Say, r fails 
while sending m and consequently m is delivered only by r’ which then sends m’ without any 
failure. The weaker version of the causal precedence property permits the correct processes p 
and q to deliver m’ without ever delivering m; the stronger version requires that the delivery of m’ 
happen only after the delivery of m.  
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In Figure 1(a) m1 → m2 and m1 → m3; m2 and m3 are not related by →, so they are said to 
be concurrent. TMCast ensures that the order of delivery for correct processes is either m1, m2, 
m3, or m1, m3, m2. There are application which may require the delivery order not to be 
identical but only respect the causal precedence relation among messages. Such a service is 
called the Causal Multicast (CMCast). This service is one of the core services provided by the 
ISIS/Horus systems [Birman91]. For many other, not-so-basic, multicast services, we refer the 
reader to [Hadzilacos93] which presents a family of multicast services and hints at implementing 
them. 
In the rest of the chapter, we will regard RMCast and AMCast as basic multicast services as 
they can be extended into CMCast and TMCast services respectively. Appendix IIA shows how 
AMCast can be extended into TMCast (with the stronger causal precedence property). The 
principles behind this extension can be applied to extend RMCast into CMCast and the details 
can be seen in [Hadzilacos93]. 
2.2.3 Group Membership Service 
The membership service of process p (for group G) provides to p the membership view or 
simply view which is the set of members (of G) which are deemed to be correct and connected to 
p. Whenever a new process joins G or an existing member fails or leaves G, p will obtain a new 
view reflecting the changes in the membership. The latest view p receives is called the current 
view or simply the view. The service employs a special module called the failure suspector 
whose role is to suspect failures of members in the view and indicate its suspicion which may 
result in a new view being constructed without the suspected member. A typical implementation 
of a failure suspector will involve sending periodic "I am alive" messages to members in the 
view and monitoring whether every member also does the same. We present below some of the 
fundamental and useful properties of any group membership service, using  Vip , i WRGHQRWH
the ith view constructed by the membership service of p. 
GM1: The sequence of views installed by any two correct member processes of G that do not 
suspect each other are identical (validity). 
GM2a: If r ∈ Vip leaves G or crashes or gets disconnected from p and if p does not crash, 
then eventually Vi’p such that i’ > i and r ∉ Vi’p will be constructed (exclusion liveness). 
GM2b: If a process j ∉ Vip that attempts to join G remains correct and connected to p and if p 
does not crash, then eventually Vi’p such that i’ > i and j ∈ Vi’p will be constructed (inclusion 
liveness).  
GM3: any two correct processes deliver the same set of messages between two consecutive 
views that are identical. That is, Vip ≡ Viq and Vi+1p ≡ Vi+1q implies that the set of messages 
delivered by p and q with the current view being Vi are identical. GM3 is traditionally referred to 
as the view-synchrony property, as it specifies how message delivery and view-changes are to be 
synchronised. 
Referring to Figure 1, let V1 be {P1, P2, P3, P4} and V2 = V1 - {P3}. The arc labelled Vi 
indicates the timing instances when a process makes Vi as its current view. View synchrony is 
preserved in both (a) and (b). A stronger version of the view-synchrony, called the virtual 
synchrony, also requires that if p sends m in Vip (i.e., with the current view being Vip) then every 
q that delivers m delivers it only in Viq ≡ Vip. Virtual synchrony is preserved only in Fig. 1(b). 
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The ISIS system [Birman91] which first identified the importance of synchronising message 
delivery with view-changes in asynchronous systems, provides virtual synchrony.  
View Synchrony and System Asynchrony 
We will illustrate here that view synchrony is an important property that considerably 
simplifies programming in asynchronous distributed systems. Let process p RMDeliver a 
message m with current view being Vi. In a synchronous system, p can assume that at least |Vi| - 
f processes would deliver m, where f is the assumed bound on the number of processes that can 
fail. Since bound f is inviolatable, this assumption of p is correct and can be used to reason about 
system behaviour. But in an asynchronous system, a crashed process cannot be distinguished 
from a slow one, and hence it is possible for a set of correct processes in Vi to suspect wrongly 
another correct process (also in Vi) and to remove it from Vi+1. This undesirable event is called 
virtual partitioning whereby within a group of correct and connected processes, one subgroup 
regards another subgroup to have become disconnected. It can be caused by the increased 
network traffic or congestion that made the timeouts of failure suspectors too small to make only 
correct suspicions. Virtual partitioning leads to virtual failures, and hence no realistic bound f can 
be made. So, when p RMDelivers m in view Vi it cannot know, at the time of delivering m, how 
many in Vi would also deliver m. View synchrony property provides the only guarantee that can 
be provided regarding who would certainly deliver m: m is delivered by all correct processes in 
Vi ∩ Vi+1, with an implication that a process in Vi - Vi+1 may or may not have delivered m. 
Types of Membership Services 
Failure suspectors do not make mistakes in synchronous systems, except perhaps when the 
fault type assumed is Byzantine. Given the mistake-free suspectors, it is straightforward to build 
a synchronous membership service using an AMCast service. We refer the reader to 
[Cristian96a] for complete service specification and to [Cristian91b] for implementation details. 
From now on, we will concentrate only on asynchronous membership services, and that too, in 
the most restrictive failure model of crash. 
Mistakes by suspectors are possible in asynchronous system even if we admit only crash 
failures. Consider a group G whose members are initialised with identical V0 = G. Let failure 
suspectors of members p and q suspect each other mutually. The group membership services of p 
and q should not unilaterally construct their own version of V1. Otherwise, the properties GM1- 
GM3 stated above cannot be met. So, the services of p and q must act together with those 
processes who also share their respective suspicion. Say, Gp (and Gq respectively) is the subset 
of G which suspect q (and p respectively). For simplicity, we will assume that Gp and Gq are 
disjoint and Gp ∪ Gq = G. (In fact, it is possible for a member of G not to suspect or to suspect 
both p and q. So, Gp and Gq can overlap and a member of G may not be in either Gp or Gq; these 
cases are discussed later.) Let processes of Gp (and Gq respectively) install V1 without q (and p 
respectively).  Now, we have members of G having two different views at the same time: 
processes of sub-group Gp holding a view without q and those of sub-group Gq holding a view 
without p. A service that permits members to hold distinct and concurrent views is called the 
partitionable membership service. A service that ensures that the ith view, i   KHOG E\ D
member is unique (given that the initial view for i = 0 is unique) is called the primary partition 
membership service.  
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A primary partition service in the above example will allow at most one sub-group (Gp or Gq 
or none) to install V1. Selection of at most one eligible sub-group is based on some notion of 
quorum [Jajodia89]: only the sub-group that has the quorum can proceed with installing V1. A 
simple way to specify quorum can be that any eligible sub-group must contain the majority of the 
current view (here V0). It is possible that neither subgroup has the quorum: say, G = {p, q, r, s, 
s’}, s’ is crashed, Gp = {p, r} and Gq = {q, s}. When there is no quorum, construction of V1 will 
be delayed until process reconnection/recovery allows a subgroup with quorum to be formed. 
This delay in the formation of the next view leads to delay in the delivery of received messages, 
if these messages are to delivered in identical/causal/total order; thus, it can cause application 
being blocked from making progress. On the other hand, a primary partition service keeps the 
splitting of a group into quorumless sub-groups transparent to the applications. (The only effect 
the applications might see is a halt in the flow of delivered messages which, in an asynchronous 
system, can equally be attributed to slow message transmission.) 
2.3. Implementation of Basic Multicast Services 
We will suppose that the underlying communication subsystem provides a path between any 
two correct processes of G, filters duplicates and does not generate messages of its own. Stated 
precisely, it has the following two properties: 
A message m sent by a correct process is eventually received by all correct destinations of m. 
(Property 1) 
A correct process q has received m implies that some process r has sent m and q will not receive 
the same m again from r. (Property 2) 
The primitive send(m, G) enables a process to multicast message m to members of group G; a 
member of G receives a message m multicast in G by executing receive(m, G). 
2.3.1. RMCast Service 
Let RMSend(m, G) and RMDeliver(m, G) be two operations supported by this service which 
are used respectively to reliably multicast (RMCast) m in G and to deliver any RMCast m 
destined for members of G. We present below the algorithms for these RMCast operations.  
RMSend(m, G) 
{ tag m with sender of m and seqNo;  // m uniquely identified 
 send(m, G);  
} 
RMDeliver(m, G) 
{ repeat forever 
 { receive(m, G);   // blocks if there is no m to be received 
  if (m is new) then 
  { if sender of m is not local then send(m, G);  
   return (m);  // an invocation of RMDeliver(m, G) returns m 
  } 
 } 
} 
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The above algorithms are based on the message diffusion principle: a member that receives a 
new message, multicasts it to every other member in the group. This diffusion ensures that what 
is received by one correct process is received by all other correct processes. Since a correct 
process always RMdelivers a newly received message, the agreement property of the RMCast is 
met. Further, a correct process RMDelivers only new messages and therefore it does not 
RMDeliver a given m more than once. The other two properties of the RMCast now follow from 
the two properties assumed for the communication subsystem. Note that the above algorithms 
work in both models and in all fault types discussed.  
A final remark on the RMCast implementation: assessing whether a received m is new can be 
tricky if the assumed fault type is arbitrary and if a faulty process sends more than one message, 
say m and m’, with the same sequence number. If m and m’ are to be regarded as distinct, then 
every process must log all messages it RMDelivers and check every received message against 
this log to assess its newness; otherwise, it is enough to log only the {sender, seqNo} pair of all 
RMDelivered messages. 
2.3.2. AMCast Service 
To present the issues behind achieving AMCast, let us consider how RMCast can be extended 
into AMCast. When a correct p RMDelivers m, it knows that every other correct q in G would 
also RMDeliver m (if q has not done so already). AMCast requires that p and q deliver m in an 
identical order; this in turn requires that p and q decide identically on the delivery order for m 
before they AMDeliver m. Deciding the delivery order is straightforward in the absence of 
process failures: fix one member in G as the sequencer which will decide the delivery order for 
every m it RMDelivers and RMCasts its decision for m. Every other process accepts the 
sequencer’s decision as its own. (This simple idea is used in [Garcia-Molina91] to provide 
AMCast in multiple, overlapping groups.) Sequencer based solutions do not work if we permit 
process failures. So, each member should propose to every other member the delivery order it 
wishes to give for a given m, and all correct should identically choose one of the proposed orders 
as the final one. This task of correct processes agreeing on a common decision is a fundamental 
problem in distributed computing. It is called the interactive consistency [Pease80, Lamport82] 
or more commonly the consensus problem.  
Informally, in the consensus problem, all correct processes propose a value and must agree on 
some value that is related to the proposed values. It is precisely specified as follows: 
Agreement: No two correct processes decide on different values; 
Validity:  if all correct processes propose v, then all correct processes decide v. 
Integrity:  if a correct process decides v, then v must have been proposed by some process. 
Termination: All correct processes decide eventually. 
An algorithm that solves consensus in a synchronous model for Byzantine fault assumptions, 
is given in [Pease80]. It requires the number of faulty processes (f) to be less than one third of the 
total number of processes (n) in G; i.e., n  f+1. With the use of message authentication 
facilities [Rivest78], this requirement drops to n  f+1. Since Byzantine fault type subsumes 
every other fault type, if a problem is solvable with Byzantine fault assumptions, then it is 
solvable under any other fault setting. So AMCast is implementable in synchronous systems for 
any type of fault assumptions. 
Building AMCast as an extension of RMCast need not always be efficient. Appendix IIB 
presents the protocol of [Cristian85] which provides an efficient AMCast service in a 
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synchronous system for n  f+2. The protocol assumes message authentication and is based on 
one of the three algorithms in [Lamport82]. It also serves to expose certain features that are so 
characteristic of designing synchronous distributed applications, and they are: (i) any violation of 
the known bounds σ, δ and κ is a failure (known bounds are correct); (ii) the maximum number 
of failures that can occur is a known constant f (known bound on failures); (ii) if f is exceeded, 
the system can behave in an unpredictable manner (inviolatable bound on failures); and, (iv) 
there exists a known constant ε such that if a correct process executes a common event e (such as 
delivering a multicast m) at time t, then it knows, by time t+ε, that (a) every correct process 
executes e (timed knowledge on unanimity), and (b) every correct process knows that every 
correct process has executed e (timed common knowledge).  
It is formally proved in [Fischer85] that consensus cannot be deterministically solved in an 
asynchronous system even with one faulty process that can fail only by crashing. This 
impossibility comes from a correct process’s inability to correctly distinguish a crashed process 
from a slow one. Since the result is shown for the most restrictive fault type, we can conclude 
that a fault-tolerant AMCast service cannot be built in an asynchronous system using 
deterministic algorithms. Recall that AMCast service is an important service to achieve 
distributed fault tolerance. This impossibility result forced researchers to seek ways of 
circumventing it and these attempts can be classified into two categories. First, probabilistic 
solutions for consensus were developed [Ben-Or83, Bracha85]. Since responsive systems need to 
provide guarantees of services, this probabilistic approach did not become popular with 
practitioners. The second approach is to establish a set of minimal restrictions on the attributes of 
the asynchronous model such that the system makes progress when these restrictions hold and it 
behaves in a programmed exceptional manner when these restrictions do not hold. 
2.4. Realising the Assumptions of Synchronous Model 
Hard real-time systems are designed to guarantee that the timeliness requirements of all 
critical transactions are always satisfied. Working with the synchronous model is the most 
natural and obvious way to design such systems. How then the assumptions about the bounds on 
processing and communications delays can be realised? This requires gathering accurate 
information about the peak load to which the system environment can subject the system. The 
peak load may be expressed in terms of the maximum interval between consecutive transactions. 
This peak load combined with the worst-case fault scenario gives rise to the context in which the 
worst case delays are experienced. These worst case delays determine the bounds assumed to be 
known in the synchronous model. 
Given that the peak load can be predicted fairly accurately and the worst case delays can be 
estimated, the system must have mechanisms that would attempt to preserve the validity of the 
estimated bounds when the actual load occasionally exceeds the predicted peak load. Most real-
time systems are event-triggered (ET) ones in the sense that they are designed to respond to 
requests from the environment. When there is no response, the system remains idle; if the arrival 
rate of requests does not exceed the peak load, the responses are timely. ET systems however are 
prone to event showers [Kopetz91, Kopetz97] during which the input arrival rate can far exceed 
the maximum rate assumed, due to the development of an exceptional situation such as fire, 
leakage, explosion etc. An event shower often comprises of alarm messages, most of which 
redundant and repetitive, and some of which got multiplied while being propagated through the 
system. ET systems require flow or load control to be exercised between the environment and the 
system, so that the presumed maximum arrival rate is seldom exceeded. (During an event 
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shower, the information flow into the system is controlled by suppressing redundant and 
repetitive alarms, and by delaying less important signals.) 
Another class of real-time systems, called the time-triggered (TT) system, assumes that the 
peak load is known accurately. With this central assumption, they are designed as a collection of 
periodic automata. A computational task is invoked only at predefined, periodic points in time. If 
there is no input in a given invocation, the task execution will not happen; if there are inputs to 
process, the task is executed and the output is released (also at predefined points in time). For 
example, an alarm-processing task is invoked at periodic instances to see if there is an alarm to 
be served. So, an urgent alarm may have to wait for at most one period before being served. In 
TT systems, task scheduling is computed off-line and static; communication is also time-
triggered: a set of nodes divide time among themselves as slots, and a node sends its messages 
only during its slot. This avoids collision in the shared media, and the sent messages are 
guaranteed to have bounded transmission times. 
Every periodic automaton processing the maximum number of requests at every invocation, 
defines the peak load. If the system has enough processing resources and if critical tasks are 
scheduled with appropriate frequencies, then the timing requirements of the environment can be 
guaranteed to be satisfied. With TT systems, it is claimed that testing the system and developing 
correctness proofs are simple. They are excellent for small static environments and repetitive 
processes, such as fly-by-wire. They are not suited to large-scale or dynamic settings. MARS is a 
pure TT system and its features are discussed in [Kopetz89]. 
2.5. Restricting Asynchronous Model 
While synchronous assumptions may be too restrictive to be realistic in many applications, 
asynchronous model does not allow many an important service to be built. A middle way is often 
found by applying timing restrictions on the asynchronous model with a caveat that there may be 
periods of instability during which the applied restrictions may not hold and the system should 
be designed to behave in a predictably safe manner during such periods. The restrictions take the 
form of choosing likely bounds on message transmission, process scheduling, etc. These timing 
restrictions can be explicit where these likely bounds assumed are parameterised, and normal and 
unstable periods are defined in terms of these parameters; it can alternatively be implicit where 
certain systemic conditions are specified, leaving the application to choose appropriate bounds, 
statically or adaptively, so that these systemic conditions specified hold most of the time. 
Examples of such systemic conditions are: if at least a majority of processes in G are correct and 
connected, at least a majority of G must eventually see each other correct and connected; there 
must exist at least one correct process that is never suspected by the suspectors of any 
functioning process. The two types of membership services represent two ways of implicitly 
restricting the asynchronous model. 
2.5.1. Implicit Timing 
Failure suspectors wait on timeouts for "I am alive" messages to be received periodically from 
other members. When the expected message from a given member is missing for a few, 
consecutive times, then that member is suspected. These timeouts are chosen based on the 
experience with the network performance so that (i) incorrect suspicions are minimal and, (ii) 
any two correct and connected processes that suspect each other, eventually begin to see each 
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other correct and connected. With this assumption of eventual correctness of timeout bounds 
used, applications can be built using membership services. 
Partitionable Membership Service 
Say p suspects q and multicasts its suspicion to exclude q from the current view. Once p has 
announced its suspicion to other members, p should not unilaterally reverse its suspicion, even if 
it sees an overwhelming evidence to do so; otherwise another process r that has already acted on 
p’s suspicion may be put in an inconsistent state. A suspicion leads to the exclusion of the 
suspected only through agreement being reached with the unsuspected: the process p whose 
current view is V will construct the next view (V- S) only after every process in (V- S) has 
announced its suspicion on every member of S. For example, if V = {p, q, r, s, s’} and if p 
suspects {q, s’}, then to form the next view as {p, r, s} p must receive "I suspect q" and "I 
suspect s’ " messages from r and s. By transforming suspicions into "agreed failures", a way 
(albeit imperfect) is found to get around the inherent inability to distinguish slow processes from 
crashed ones: a suspected process may indeed be functioning or communicating slowly, but it 
will be treated as a crashed one if, say, every one else in the group suspects it. With this 
imperfect way of ’distinguishing’ crashed ones from slow ones, consensus can be solved not 
necessarily among all correct processes, but perhaps within subgroups of mutually unsuspecting 
processes. This then leads to the possibility of building AMCast service and applications using 
the basic multicast services. 
Reaching agreement on the suspected is central to partitionable membership service. It also 
helps sort out inconsistent failure suspicions held by mutually unsuspecting members. When p is 
seeking the exclusion of q through agreement, if a third process r (which p does not suspect) 
does not suspect q then r can refute p’s suspicion of q; p can then either reverse its suspicion of q 
or add r to its suspect list. Further, an incorrect suspicion need not be symmetric: when p 
suspects q, q may not suspect p. It can also be intransitive: p suspects q, q suspects r, but p does 
not suspect r. This asymmetry and intransitivity in the suspicion chain are sorted out when 
agreement on suspicions is waited for. But the agreement on suspicions cannot prevent the 
formation of concurrent, overlapping views as the example below shows:  
 
 
views of P1
views of P4
P1
P2
P3
P4
P1 P2 P3
P1 P2 P3 P4 P4
 
Fig. 2: Concurrent Overlapping Group views 
Fig. 2 shows a group consisting of processes P1, P2, P3 and P4; initially all processes have 
the same membership view. Assume that P1 suspects P4 and the suspicion is confirmed by P2, 
P3, as a result, the view of P1 is changed to exclude P4 (P2 and P3 will also update their views to 
exclude P4). On the other hand, P4 has not (yet) suspected anyone, so its view remains 
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unchanged. This is however a temporary situation, as P4 will eventually suspect P1, P2 and P3 
(since these have stopped communicating with P4) and its view will be updated to exclude them. 
It is proved in [Babaoglu95b] that no non-blocking implementation can guarantee absence of 
overlapping concurrent views. 
The most effective way to use a partitionable service is to use appropriate timeouts so that 
virtual partitions do not occur. What if the timeouts used turned out to be the most inadequate 
ones? The group gets split into singleton islands, whereby each functioning member considers 
itself as the "sole" surviving member of the group, as P4 in Figure 2. This comes about because a 
member has to reach agreement on the suspected only with the unsuspected ones; if a member 
suspects every other member then it is entitled to decide a view that contains only itself! Though 
this outcome could be an extremely unlikely scenario in a sensible set-up, it shows that (i) a 
partitionable membership service (unlike consensus) is implementable in an asynchronous 
system; and (ii) it is not however specifiable identifying the above scenario as an illegitimate 
behaviour. That is, a trivial implementation in which each member simply regards itself as the 
only member, is a legitimate implementation of a partitionable service! Many specifications get 
around this trivial implementation with careful choice of words. 
Bibliographic Notes:  There are at least three known implementations of partitionable 
membership service.  Babaoglu et al have done an extensive work in this area. [Babaoglu95c, 
Babaoglu97a, Babaoglu97b] presents specifications and algorithms, and [Babaoglu95a] the 
Relacs system. The Transis System [Dolev96] implements a partitionable membership service on 
a broadcast medium, and the algorithms can be found in [Amir92]. Specifications in the context 
of multiple, overlapping groups are presented in the Newtop paper [Ezhilchelvan95], and 
[Morgan99] describes a CORBA-compliant implementation of Newtop. 
Programming with Partitionable Membership Service 
Consider a task that needs to be done in steps S1, S2, .. Si, ..  such that at least Ni processes in 
G must have executed a given step Si, before any process can start executing S(i+1). Process p 
completes step Si and RMCasts a message announcing its completion of Si, to members in its 
view V. It then waits for at least (Ni - 1) other processes to RMCast a similar message. Due to a 
partitionable service, the waiting must terminate with one of two possible outcomes: p 
RMDelivers the required number of messages, or p RMDelivers fewer messages than the 
required number and installs a view V’ of size smaller than Ni. In case of the first outcome, p can 
start executing the next step. If p experiences the second outcome, by view synchrony, every 
correct q in V’ has delivered the same number of messages. The second outcome should cause 
processes of V’ to execute an exception Ei which may cause processes to change their states. Say, 
an execution of Ei involves state changes. When p later installs an enhanced view V" of size Ni 
or more, it must reconcile its state with those of the merging members of (V" - V’) who may 
have delivered in the past a different set of messages and therefore undergone a different set of 
state changes. State reconciliation is application specific, and none of partitionable systems 
seriously addresses the problem. It may not be possible (without some human intervention) if 
merging members have carried out mutually inconsistent actions when they were in different 
virtual partitions. [Babaoglu97b] proposes the notion of extended virtual synchrony to facilitate 
reconciliation when partitioned sub-groups merge.  
When Ei involves no processing or processing of read-only requests only, its execution will 
leave the process state unchanged. In that case, merging members may have to do only state 
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update - updating their state to the most recent one which can be found among the merging 
members. State update is easier to achieve compared to state reconciliation. Avoiding state 
reconciliation also requires that all but at most one of the concurrent sub-groups execute Ei, and 
the one sub-group (if any) that does not execute Ei has the quorum. Managing the merging of 
sub-groups in quorum based environments needs to be aware of certain subtle problems, which 
are outlined and solved in [Lotem97, Ezhilchelvan99]. 
Primary Partition Membership Service 
While partitionable membership service can be implemented in a non-blocking manner and 
cannot be specified ruling out trivial implementations, primary partition membership service can 
be specified precisely but cannot be implemented in a non-blocking manner. The core 
specification of a primary partition service is that there should be no concurrent views, and the 
ith view installed by any member must be the same. The inability to implement this, is due to 
what made solving consensus impossible. (See [Chandra96b] for proofs.) To see this intuitively, 
assume G = {P1, P2, P3, P4} = V0 and processes fail in the most benign manner of fail-stop: a 
failing process announces its crash as the last event before it crashes. Say, P1 and P2 crash 
without receiving each other’s failure announcement. Say, P3 receives P1’s failure announcement 
followed by P2’s; so, P3 will construct V1 = {P2, P3, P4} and then V2 = {P3, P4}. If P4 receives 
P2’s failure announcement first and then P1’s, it will construct V1 = {P1, P3, P4} and then V2 = 
{P3, P4}. P3 and P4 do not construct the same V1, which is not permitted. Thus, any 
implementation of a primary partition service requires announcements being received in an 
identical order - an AMCast property that requires consensus to be solved in a non-blocking 
manner. It is important to understand this impossibility, as there are some pre-1990 publications 
in the literature which claim to present non-blocking implementations while in fact they make 
implicit assumptions restricting asynchrony. 
[Chandra96a] derives a family of failure detector classes, with each class mapped onto a set of 
system requirements. The requirement set becomes weaker for weaker failure detectors.  
[Chandra96c] identifies the weakest failure detector (denoted as ◊W) for solving the consensus 
problem which is defined by the following two properties: 
Weak Completeness: Eventually every process that crashes is permanently suspected by some 
correct process; 
Eventual Weak Accuracy: There is a time after which some correct process is not suspected. 
Failure detectors use timeouts to suspect failures, and, unlike failure suspectors, can 
unilaterally reverse their suspicions if they see evidence for that. Weak Completeness guarantees 
that at least one correct process will eventually stop reversing its suspicion of a crashed member. 
Eventual weak accuracy rules out trivial implementation (of every one permanently suspecting 
everyone else) and restricts the mistakes the failure detector can make: there must eventually 
exist at least one correct process to which all correct processes must eventually find themselves 
connected to. (Note that a correct process that does not get suspected by any correct process, 
need not be aware of its status.) 
[Chandra96a] proposes a protocol that uses ◊W and solves consensus if a majority of 
processes do not crash. In other words, if a majority of members in G are correct, and if those 
two properties of ◊W are upheld by the underlying system conditions for a sufficiently long 
period, then the consensus will be solved; otherwise, the protocol execution makes no progress. 
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Note that the system may get unstable (i.e. the properties of ◊W may not hold) temporarily any 
number of times during a given execution of the consensus protocol, and the execution will 
terminate so long as the system eventually remains stable for a sufficiently long period; in other 
words, temporary periods of instability can only have the effect of delaying the termination of 
the protocol execution, and cannot make the execution terminate incorrectly nor make it non-
terminatable. 
Being able to solve consensus (whenever the requirements are met), enables us to build the 
AMCast service and therefore distributed applications. The protocol of [Chandra96a] assumes 
that a crashed process never recovers; this is relaxed in [Aguilera98]. Using a ◊W-based 
consensus protocol, a primary-partition membership service is designed in [Malloth95] and 
implemented in [Felber98]. 
2.5.2. Explicit Timing: Timed Asynchronous Model 
This model was developed from infancy to maturity by Flaviu Cristian, with his experience on 
the design of Air-Traffic Control Systems [Cristian96b] which is based on synchronous 
assumptions. In this model, restrictions of synchronous model were relaxed and some 
synchronous bounds that were assumed to hold with certainty are taken to be the most likely 
bounds. That is, the known bounds σ and δ of the synchronous model are no longer infallible, 
but are only highly likely to hold; but the bound κ on clock drift rate is certain to hold. 
Timed model deals with failures and virtual partitions very similar to the partitionable 
membership approach. We merely highlight these similarities here. A fail-aware datagram 
service, while delivering messages, indicates late messages. A late message is the one that has 
taken a transmission delay of more than ∆, for some ∆ > δ, δ where δ is the likely bound 
assumed for message transmission delays. With this fail-aware service, a process can detect 
members that have a round trip time of more than 2∆ and such members are suspected to have 
failed. Any asymmetries and intransitivities in the suspect relation are smoothed out through an 
execution of a leader election algorithm, which ensures that partitions are non-overlapping and 
there is at most one leader in any partition. Unlike in a partitionable membership system, 
partitions of timed model are synchronous subsystems wherein members are guaranteed to be 
able to exchange messages within some known ∆. So, they can be programmed as in 
synchronous model, except that there is no bound f on the number of processes that can fail. So, 
as in the partitionable membership systems, the members are programmed to exhibit exceptional 
behaviour when they see "too many" failures, and resume normal operations when they merge in 
sufficient numbers.  
Bibliographic Notes: A description of this model and justifications for the assumptions of the 
model, can be found in [Cristian99]. [Fetzer98] describes the fail-aware datagram service that is 
central to failure suspicion, and [Fetzer99] the leader election protocol. The applicability of 
timed model to building real-time applications are argued in [Fetzer97a], using traffic control as 
an example application. The Fortress system [Fetzer97b] implements the basic services of this 
model and enables real-time applications to be built.  
2.6. Concluding Remarks 
We have presented the synchronous and the asynchronous models of distributed systems. In 
the restricted synchronous model, fault tolerant applications can be built for all fault types: from 
the most benign to the arbitrary. The maximum number f of faults expected during a given period 
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is assumed to be known and bounded. The larger the f, the higher is the cost of fault-tolerance 
paid. While it is preferable to have small f, it must however be large enough to accommodate not 
just real failures but also the virtual ones - the latter occurring whenever the assumed bounds of 
the synchronous model are being violated. The unrestricted, asynchronous model is useless for 
developing deterministic programs even with the most benign failure assumptions. It needs to be 
restricted, and we have shown three ways of applying restrictions. They involve (i) using a 
primary partition membership service, (ii) using a partitionable membership service, and (iii) 
timing the asynchronous model. We have described each approach, highlighting the conditions 
that need to be met for applications to make progress. 
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Appendix IIA: Extending AMCast into TMCast 
A process p that intends to TMCast its message m’, piggybacks onto m’ the pair {identifier, 
sender} of all TMCast m which it has sent and delivered so far, and then sends m’ using the 
AMCast service. Note that m → m’. Say, a process q that receives m’ from the AMCast service is 
to observe the following two message-delivery rules: (i) m’ is delivered according to the AMCast 
order determined by the AMCast service; and, (ii) m’ is delivered after delivering all m whose 
{identifier, sender} pair is piggybacked onto m’. If both these rules can be enforced for all m’, 
then correct processes will deliver messages in an identical order (which is the AMCast order) 
that also respects causal precedence property. However, if the AMCast order for a given m that is 
in the piggyback of m’, is after the AMCast order of m’, the two rules are in conflict with each 
other. This is resolved in the following manner. If the sender of m is p which also sent m’, rule (i) 
takes priority over rule (ii) to ensure causal precedence: delivery of m’ is delayed until m is 
delivered. If the sender of m is not p, then q concludes p to be faulty and discards every message 
(including m’) from p. The rationale for such a conclusion by q is explained below. 
We will first observe that both p and q cannot be correct by the properties of the AMCast 
service: p claims to have received m from the AMCast service and to have delivered m before it 
sends m’, while q finds that AMCast order of m is not before that of m’. Since correct processes 
receive any two AMCast messages in an identical order, either p or q must be faulty. As every 
process regards itself correct, q concludes that p is a faulty process and has delivered a message 
that is never going to delivered by any correct process. So, it does not deliver any message sent 
by p in order to meet the stronger causal precedence requirement. Observe that process q 
(correct or not) being allowed to discard messages it receives from another process p, poses no 
problem: if q is correct, then p must be faulty and the RMCast properties permit a correct process 
not to deliver a faulty process’s message; if q is not correct, RMCast properties do not put any 
delivery requirement for a faulty process. 
When all correct processes follow rules (i) and (ii) and identically resolve any conflict, they 
deliver an identical subset of AMCast messages in an identical order that respects causal 
precedence relation. For this transformation to work in practice, the piggybacked information 
needs to be kept finite. This is done as follows. A process no longer needs to piggyback the 
{identifier, sender} pair of a sent or delivered m, if it has sent to every process at least one m’ 
whose piggyback contained those details of m. 
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Appendix IIB: An Atomic Multicast Protocol For Synchronous Systems 
As in any synchronous model, we assume known constants δ, ε, and f such that correct processes 
can exchange messages within δ time, and have their clocks synchronised within ε time; at most 
f processes (out of n, n > f+1) can be faulty. The following assumption to restrict the arbitrariness 
of a faulty process’s failures is also made. 
Each process can sign the messages it sends, and authenticate the signed messages it receives 
[Rivest78] such that: 
(a) A correct process’s signature for a given message is unique and cannot be generated by 
any other process. 
(b) Any attempt to alter the contents of a correct process’s signed message is detected by any 
other correct process. 
Using the signature facility, a process can sign the message it forms, and over-sign a signed 
message it receives and relays. The ith signature (i > 1) on a message m is computed by treating 
the contents of m and the first (i-1) signatures as a single unit of information. Note that message 
signatures are not just signer-dependent but also contents-dependent. We assume that a  process 
evaluates a boolean function authentic(m) which returns true only if m is signed by one or more 
distinct processes and each signature is authentic; signers(m) returns the set of processes that 
have signed m. The AMCast protocol is expressed in three concurrently executed parts: 
AMSend(m, G) is invoked when a process wishes to atomically multicast m in G; AMDiffuse runs 
for ever, storing a received message that is found to be acceptable, into the set accepted_bag of 
messages and then relaying it to those processes that have not signed it; AMDeliver delivers 
atomically multicast messages. 
AMSend(m, G) 
{ tag m with sender of m and seqNo;  // m uniquely identified 
 m.Type = amcast; m.TS = clock; m.S =sign(m);  // m is timestamped and 
signed 
 send(m, G);  
} 
Before being atomically multicast, m is timestamped with local send time and is signed.  
AMDiffuse(m, G) 
{ repeat forever 
 { AMreceive(m, G);  // blocks if there is no m, m.Type = amcast, to be received 
  if (m is new) ∧ (authentic(m)) ∧ (1_m.S| f+1) ) then 
  { recv_time = clock;  // note down the receive time;  
   if (m.TS - (|m.S|)ε recv_time m.TS + (|m.S|)(δ+ε) ) then  // m timely .. 
   { accepted_bag = accepted_bag ∪ {m};      // so, accept and diffuse 
    if (|m.S| < (f+1) ) then { m.S = m.S // sign(m); send(m, G); } 
   } 
  } 
 } 
} 
  27
If a received AMCast message is new, authentic and has at most (f+1) signatures, its timeliness is 
checked. It is regarded timely if it is received in the interval [m.TS - (|m.S|)ε, m.TS + 
(|m.S|)(δ+ε)],  where m.TS and m.S are respectivelythe timestamp of m and the number of 
processes that have signed m. A timely message is accepted, and diffused if it has been signed 
only by less than (f+1) processes. 
 
RMDeliver(m, G) 
{ wait until at least one m in accepted_bag, clock P76I1)(δ+ε);  
 m = message in accepted_bag with the smallest (timestamp+sender_id) 
 accepted_bag = accepted_bag - {m};  
 return (m);  // an invocation of RMDeliver(m, G) returns m 
} 
 
No attempt to deliver an accepted message m is made before clock time m.TS + (f+1)(δ+ε). 
This ensures that if there is any AMCast message m’, m’.TS m.TS, m’ enters the accepted_bag 
by clock time m.TS + (f+1)(δ+ε). Accepted messages are delivered in the order of their 
timestamps, and in the order of their sender-ids if timestamps are equal. So, provided correct 
processes accept identical set of messages, they would deliver identical messages in an identical 
order. 
Consider that a correct process p AMSends m with timestamp m.TS. The clock of another 
correct process q reads a value in the interval [m.TS-ε, m.TS+ε] when p’s clock reads m.TS. Since 
m from p can take a transmission delay of zero to at most δ time, q could receive m when its 
clock reads a value in the interval [m.TS-ε, m.TS+δ+ε]. That is, q will find m timely and will 
accept it. 
Suppose that p is the first correct process to accept an AMCast message m with timestamp 
m.TS. Since no correct process has signed m, |m.S| must be less than (f+1). Since p found m 
timely, it must have received m when its clock read a value in the interval [m.TS-iε, 
m.TS+i(δ+ε)], where i = |m.S|. When p signs and diffuses m, every other correct process q 
receives m when q’s clock reads a value in [m.TS-(i+1)ε, m.TS+(i+1)(δ+ε)]. That is, every other 
correct q will find the diffused m timely and will accept it. Thus, correct processes accept 
identical set of each other’s own and diffused messages. 
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 3. Fault-tolerance in CORBA 
3.1. Introduction 
Object Management Group’s (OMG’s) Common Object Request Broker Architecture 
(CORBA) specification provides an industry standard for building applications from distributed 
objects; two of its main features are: 
• Object Request Broker (ORB), which enables objects to invoke operations on objects in a 
distributed, heterogeneous environment. This component is the core of the OMG reference 
model. Internet Inter-ORB-Protocol (IIOP) has been specified to enable ORBs from different 
vendors to communicate with each other over the Internet. 
• Common Object Services, a collection of ‘middleware’ services that support functions for 
using and implementing objects. Such services are considered to be necessary for the 
construction of any distributed application. These include transactions, concurrency control, 
persistence, and many more. 
Although CORBA provides portability, location transparency and interoperability of 
applications across heterogeneous platforms (architectures, operating systems and languages), it 
lacks adequate support for fault tolerance. CORBA does provide a transaction service. A 
common technique for fault-tolerance is through the use of atomic transactions, which have the 
well known ACID properties, operating on persistent (long-lived) objects. Transactions ensure 
that only consistent state changes take place despite concurrent access and failures. However, 
they may be insufficient to ensure that an application makes forward progress. It is possible to 
improve the probability of forward progress by increasing the availability of an application’s 
objects (resources) by replicating them on several nodes (machines), and managing them through 
appropriate replica-consistency protocols; group communication protocols can be used for 
implementing replica consistency protocols. Currently there is no OMG standard for an object 
group service. Design and development of fault-tolerant group communication protocols for 
CORBA has therefore been a very active area of research [Felber98, Moser99, Morgan99]. 
Three ways of incorporating object groups in CORBA have been identified [Felber98]. The 
integration approach takes an existing group communication system and replaces the transport 
service of the ORB by the group service. Although this is a very efficient way of incorporating 
group functionality in an ORB, the main disadvantage is that this approach is not CORBA 
compliant, lacking in interoperability. The second approach called the interceptor approach also 
makes use of an existing group communication system; here (IIOP) messages issued by an ORB 
are intercepted and mapped on to calls of the group communication system. The best known 
example of this approach is the Eternal system for object replication that makes use of Totem 
group communication system in this manner [Moser99]. The major advantage of this approach is 
that no modifications to the ORB are required. The shortcomings are that the approach is only 
possible if the host operating system permits interception (Unix in the case of Eternal); secondly, 
as the group communication system is not available to CORBA application builders, it can only 
be used in a fixed manner (replication in the case of Eternal). The third approach is the service 
approach: it does not make use of any existing group communication system; rather the group 
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communication system is implemented as a CORBA service from scratch. In addition to being 
CORBA compliant, the advantage here is that the service is available to application builders so 
can be used for a variety of purposes. This approach was first developed in the Object Group 
Service (OGS) [Felber98], and has been taken in other group services such as Newtop 
(Newcastle total order protocol) [Morgan99]. In the following we describe salient features of 
Newtop. 
3.2. Newtop as a CORBA Service 
An application developer creates potential group members as CORBA objects (such objects 
are defined by an IDL interface). A single group member is addressable via a single object 
reference (IOR). This enables the Newtop service to identify group members and associate them 
to groups. A group member will also be referred to as a client of the Newtop service. The 
Newtop service is a distributed service and achieves distribution with the aid of the Newtop 
service object (NSO), see fig. 1. Each client (group member) is allocated an NSO. Group related 
communication required by a client is handled by its NSO. Only one NSO is required by a client, 
irrespective of how many groups the client participates in. Communication between a client and 
its NSO is handled by the ORB. Therefore, the NSO may reside within the same address space, 
in a different address space, or on a different node in the network to the group member 
associated with it. The most efficient configuration would be the client and its NSO within the 
same address space. 
Client A
Client B
Client CNSO (C)
NSO (A)
NSO (B)
Newtop s ervic e
Messages governed
by Newtop
protocols
Application
dependent
messages
 
Fig. 1: Clients of the NewTop service and associated NSOs. 
Internally, the NewTop service itself has been composed of a group communication 
subsystem that handles membership and reliable multicasts and an invocation subsystem. The 
group communication system provides clients with create, delete and leave group operations and 
causal and total order multicasts. In addition, it maintains the membership information (group 
view) and ensures that this information is kept mutually consistent at each member. This is 
achieved with the help of a failure suspector that initiates membership agreement as soon as a 
member is suspected to have failed. The client can obtain the current membership information by 
invoking ’groupDetails’ operation. View updates are atomic with respect to message deliveries, 
as in virtually synchronous communication. Message delivery is atomic with two types of 
ordering guarantees (causal and causality preserving total order). 
3.2.1. Application Support 
Distributed applications should be able to make use of the object group service in a number of 
application specific ways. Three main modes of interactions can be identified:  (i) request-reply: 
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a client issues a request to multiple servers and waits for their replies; this represents a 
commonly occurring scenario when a service is replicated, fig. 2(i); (ii) group-to-group 
request-reply: a generalisation of the previous case, where clients are themselves 
groups; and (iii) Peer Participation: here all the members are regularly multicasting 
messages (asynchronous invocation); this represents a commonly occurring scenario 
when the purpose of an application is to share information between members, (e.g., a 
teleconferencing application).  
Customisation within each class of interaction is frequently required for obtaining 
better performance. Consider request- reply interaction between a client and an actively 
replicated service (recall that in active replication all correctly functioning replicas 
perform processing). If the client and servers are all connected by high-speed, low latency 
network, then an efficient way of invoking the replicas would be for the client to 
multicast to the replicas directly using the underlying total order multicast service (in 
effect, the client acts as a member of the server group). On the other hand, if the client is 
separated from servers by a high latency communication path (e.g., WAN, Internet), 
then this method would be unattractive, and an alternative method that enabled a client 
to avoid directly multicasting to the replicas would be desirable. Different kinds of 
customisation might be needed for invoking passively replicated services (recall that in 
passive replication, a single copy, the primary, performs processing, the remaining members 
act as backups). NewTop therefore supports two types of groups: 
Closed group - A client is considered a member of the server group and multicasts 
requests to each member of the server group directly.  
Open group - A client is not considered a member of the server group and issues 
requests to just a single member of the server group (that then multicasts the request 
within the group). Unlike the closed group, clients do not participate in group 
communication protocols as members of the server group. 
 
(i) (ii)
Memb er
Cli ent
Cli ent/s erve r
group
Server
group
 
Figure2: Achieving closed and open groups. 
The invocation subsystem achieves the open and closed group approaches to 
client/server group interactions via overlapping of groups. A single group containing 
members that support some service is identified as a server group. Clients wishing to 
access services provided by a server group create a group containing themselves that 
overlaps with (shares membership of) the server group. A group that contains clients 
and servers is termed a client/server group. To satisfy open and closed groups, the 
overlapping of client/server and server groups may be achieved thus: closed group - 
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client/server group contains client and all members of the server group (fig. 2(i)); open 
group - client/server group contains client and only one member of the server group 
(fig.2(ii)). Here is how a client invokes members of an open group: 
The client forms a client/server group containing itself and only one member of the 
server group. As client requests are directed at only a single server, a mechanism that 
will propagate such messages throughout the server group and collect replies ready for 
returning to the client is necessary. This mechanism is described, with reference to fig. 
3, where all the multicasts are total order multicasts. 
(i) Receiving client request - A request sent within a client/server group is received 
by the server. This server is considered to be the request manager for this particular 
client (fig. 3(i)). 
(ii) Distributing client request - The request manager multicasts the request within 
the server group (fig. 3(ii)). This is achieved by the request manager acting as a client 
and issuing the incoming invocation as a new invocation. 
(iii) Receiving server replies - Each member of the server group multicasts replies 
within the group (fig. 3(iii)). This would be the case when each member is generating 
replies, as in active replication. A variation on this behaviour is when only one member 
generates the reply.    
(iv) Returning server replies to client - Server replies are gathered by the request 
manager (one, majority or all) and returned to the client (fig. 3(iv)). No reply is sent in 
case the client invocation is of type one way.  
(i) Receiving client r equest (ii) Distributing th e request
(iii) Receiving server r epli es (iv ) Returning th e reply
 
Fig. 3:  Handling client invocations in open groups. 
Transactions and groups can be used together to provide flexible ways of constructing 
available services [Little98]. Figure 4 depicts a general replication scheme for persistent objects 
(objects with permanent states stored on object stores). A persistent object not in use is assumed 
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to be held in a passive state with its state residing in an object store (a stable object repository) 
and activated on demand (i.e., when an invocation is made) by loading its state from the object 
store to the volatile store, and associating an object server process for receiving invocations. 
Here object servers are treated as a (CORBA) object group, with client invoking operations using 
open or closed group depending upon the way client server interactions have been configured. 
client
state group
server group
 
Fig. 4:  Replication of persistent objects 
 
There is no explicit requirement for an object group for managing object states; rather 
replicated data management techniques that go hand in hand with transaction commit processing 
[Bernstein 87] provide an integrated solution to object state management. 
3.3. Concluding Remarks 
The performance of the Newtop service has been extensively studied. Both the closed and 
open group configurations have been studied for both LAN clients and long-distance clients, and 
the results can be seen in [Morgan00a]. The study has been subsequently extended for long-
distance clients and admitting network disconnections and server crashes; [Morgan00b]  reports 
the results. As indicated in section 2, the Newtop system is built on the partitionable model. 
Newtop, like any other group communication system offering similar functionality, is not just 
useful for supporting networked replica management as the discussions in this section may 
imply; rather, it offers basic services essential for building networked services of desired 
scalability. Interested readers are referred to the application of Newtop in building a global 
auction service [Ezhilchelvan01b]; the architecture of this auction service can be seen in 
[Ezhilchelvan01c] and the preliminary performance figures in [Ezhilchelvan01a]. 
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